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Governance and Meta-Bureaucracy? 
Perspectives of local governance ‘partnership’ in England and Scotland 
 
John Fenwick, Karen Johnston Miller and Duncan McTavish 
 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the nature of partnerships through the research site of local governance in 
England and Scotland, engaging a range of debates and literature around governance and 
meta-governance. The research used secondary data of local authority partnership working in 
England and Scotland as well as primary qualitative data from participant observation and 
interviews with senior officials of local authorities and partner organisations. There is little to 
suggest English and Scottish practices are significantly at variance and the paper advances an 
argument of meta-bureaucracy to describe partnerships‟ activities: that is to say, partnerships 
do not represent a growth of autonomous networks and governance arrangements but rather 
an extension of bureaucratic controls. State actors remain pre-eminent within increasingly 
formalised systems of „partnership‟. 
Keywords: governance; co-governance; bureaucracy, accountability; local governance 
 
Introduction 
Partnership and governance structures are increasingly the instruments used to deliver public 
services at local, sub-national and national levels. Partnerships are referred to as the 
consensual regulation shared by public, civic and professional actors in delivering public 
services (Bode, 2006). The aim is ostensibly to improve public service planning and delivery 
in a 'joined up' way, and advance democratic and civil society inclusion. 
The theoretical underpinning of governance has generated a volume of literature on how the 
UK is currently governed, ranging from consideration of the 'hollowing out of the state' and 
the growing influence of self organising networks (Richards and Smith, 2002; Rhodes, 1997); 
the exploration of the proliferation of non-state actors; the interdependency and resource 
exchanges between these actors (Stoker, 2004; Pierre and Peters, 2000); debates around the 
„multiple centred‟ or „polycentric‟ nature of the state (Skelcher, 2005; 2000; Skelcher et al, 
2005); interactions between various network actors (e.g. Rhodes, 2000);  the extent to which 
governments are restricted to steering and monitoring with financial inducements rather than 
more direct forms of control and delivery (e.g. Stoker, 2000); etc. Further, some scholars 
suggest the power of the state may have declined, while others suggest that the state operates 
within a complex network of multiple modes of governance (see Jessop, 2003; Whitehead, 
2003; Lukes, 2004; Tenbensel, 2005).  
The multi-actor environment, implicit in governance diversity of networks and partners, has 
in turn produced a rich literature, and associated research on the fragmented and pluralised 
delivery of public services. The myriad of public sector reforms have attracted much attention 
from research in new public management to 'new public governance' (Osborne, 2009; 
Needham, 2007; McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie, 2002; Clarke and Newman, 1997). 
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The literature on co-governance and the overall supervision and oversight of these 
arrangements (termed meta-governance) focuses on twin themes. The first of these themes 
surrounds the process of governance and meta-governance. Meta-governance involves 
managing the complexity, plurality and tangled hierarchies found in prevailing modes of 
coordination (Jessop, 2004:70). Governments play a role in meta-governance by being 
involved in the redesigning of markets, in constitutional change and the juridicial re-
regulation of organisational objectives, and in organising the conditions of self-organisation 
(ibid). Thus, meta-governance does not eliminate other modes of coordination – markets, 
hierarchies and heterarchies still exist but they operate in a context of „negotiated decision 
making‟ (Jessop, 2004:70-71). Furthermore, according Jessop (2004:71) in terms of meta-
governance the „state is no longer sovereign authority…It becomes just one participant 
among pluralistic guidance system…‟ 
Local government is a key site in this arena of governance and meta-governance process. As 
Stoker (1997:53) argues, „The overall effect can be summarised as a shift from a system of 
local government to a system of local governance. Local authorities now share to a greater 
extent than before…decision making responsibilities with other agencies‟. This 
reconfiguration became evident within local government by the late 1990s (Johnson and 
Osborne, 2003; Agranoff and McGuire, 1998; 2003; Kelly, 2006; Bovaird, 2007). Through a 
series of legislative and cultural changes, local governance itself became mainstreamed. 
Consequently, in the last ten to fifteen years there has been an 'explosion of partnerships' 
surrounding local government (Jones and Stewart, 2009: 63) and various modes of 
governance have emerged (Tenbensel, 2005). In the New Labour era, the theme of 
partnership dominated thinking and practice in public service delivery. Similarly, the current 
coalition government in the UK speaks of a „Big Society‟; inclusive of citizens, civil society 
and government in co-governance arrangements solving policy problems and delivery public 
services at locality level. Partnership conjures up a relationship and a discourse with which it 
is hard to take issue: it is difficult to be against partnership. It appears to be pragmatic, 
consistent with the „what works‟ approach. It reduces the burden of funding that falls directly 
on the public sector. It sounds inclusive, appearing to offer an alternative to the private sector 
model and, at least superficially, to the neo-liberal agenda. A comprehensive study of local 
partnerships in 2002 found more than 5,500 local partnerships with spending approaching 
£5bn and with 75000 partnership board members (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). The scale 
and scope of this patchwork of bodies presents co-ordination difficulties for those 
commissioning and delivering public services as well as for users (Rhodes, 2000). 
Nonetheless, successive UK governments have embraced co-governance arrangements in 
recognition that traditional institutional boundaries are too unwieldy to deal with complex, 
cross-cutting and 'wicked' policy issues (Ling, 2002; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Newman 
2001). 
The second theme is about structures, institutions and actors in the process (Borzel and Risse 
2010). The overall theme of the paper analyses the extent to which the bureaucratic 
institutions in our case research are signalling a new form of bureaucratic decision making, 
aligned to an environment of governance, and meta-governance as outlined above.  
There is no doubt that governance, partnership structures and meta-governance processes 
affect the constituent bureaucracies. Co-governance signals an arrangement where public and 
other agencies are involved in the formulation of policy, planning and / or delivery of 
services (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006: 497). The delivery of public services through co-
governance has resulted in an unresolved tension between the differentiation and integration 
of public services, with consequent impact on staff, skills, structure, management style and 
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functioning (Brandsen and van Hout, 2006) and accountability arrangements (Johnston 
Miller, McTavish and Pyper, 2011; Leach and Lowndes, 2007). There are studies of 
partnerships which identify the persistence of hierarchy and control through analysis of the 
„architecture‟ behind partnerships (e.g. Whitehead 2007). In local government 
conventionally, hierarchy and bureaucracy are the key mechanisms for resource allocation 
and management, with an assumption of the hegemony of public sector institutions, 
democratically mandated, implementing and delivering public services. Contemporary 
aspects of local government underpin this view and remain distinctly 'traditional' and top 
down: in Scotland and England the majority of local government spending comes from 
central government (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2009; Audit 
Scotland, 2010), establishing accountability to the centre through performance and financial 
audits.  
The aim of the paper is to examine local government partnerships and their constituent 
bureaucracies, testing them through the lens of four theses of governance, adapted from 
Rhodes‟ characterisation of interactions between actors within governing networks (Rhodes, 
2000). Rhodes (2000:61) describes governance as: 
These networks are characterised, first, by interdependence between organisations. 
Governance is broader than government, covering non-state actors…Second, there are 
continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange 
resources and negotiate a shared purpose. Third, these interactions are game-like, rooted 
in trust and regulated by rules of the game…Finally, the networks have significant degree 
of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state; they are self-
organising. 
Thus, the theses include: 
1. The involvement of state and non-state actors in a network caused by a need to 
exchange resources and negotiate shared purpose. 
2. Networks are characterised by interdependence between organisations. 
3. Interactions are game-like rooted in trust. 
4. Networks have a significant degree of autonomy and are not accountable to the state, 
but self-organising. 
 
The Research Site: Local Authorities Partnerships and Governance  
 
Local authorities and their associated partnerships provide a good research base given the 
direction of travel of local government on partnerships and governance in the last two 
decades. In England the scope and number of local authority-led partnerships have increased 
since the late 1990s. Previously much partnership activity was focused around fairly narrowly 
defined economic regeneration outcomes, but attention shifted towards wider objectives and 
joint working in all areas of activity. Specifically, the Local Government Act 2000 
established 'well being' powers and laid out the frameworks for partnership work, the Health 
Act 1999 and National Health Service Act 2006 removed some obstacles to joint working and 
pooled budgets and enabled joint commissioning and integrated provision. The Children Act 
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2004 and the Police Reform Act 2002 did much the same for partnership working in their 
respective fields. Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in English council areas were 
established under the Local Government Act 2000 with the role of thematic partnerships to 
strategically commission services (Department of Communities and Local Government, 
2008: 46). 
All English councils have some kind of LSP but it is not a statutory body and has no 
corporate status. It has been a mechanism, both strategic and operational, for delivering the 
Community Strategy and the Local Area Agreements (LAA) which set out “...the “deal” 
between central government and local authority and their partners to improve services and the 
quality of life for local people‟ (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2008: 
34). Although LSPs do not all work in the same way, they have served as vehicles for 
strategic and community planning with a range of partners, while the LAA focussed attention 
on local priorities, agreed with local partners and central government, and measured by 
national indicators.   
Since the UK General Election of 2010, partnership working in England has undergone a 
change of emphasis. The coalition government abolished LAAs and the corresponding 
national indicator set. Hence, while LSPs remain, some of their work has disappeared as part 
of a move against the inherited local performance regime. There is new provision for Local 
Enterprise Partnerships, the first 24 of which were announced in October 2010 with a 
principal focus on local economic development. Legislation is also in prospect: the 
government states that its current Localism Bill “builds upon” the abolition of LAAs to 
reduce further the “...hugely complex and expensive system of performance data sets, targets 
and inspection used by central government to control local government.” (DCLG, 2010: 6). 
The legacy of LAAs remains the collective ('joined up') working of public service providers 
for common purpose, with local government given the lead role in driving partnership 
forward, including the duty to co-operate, the alignment of strategy and, to some extent, the 
pooling of budgets. 
Scotland had developed a comparable set of arrangements. The Local Government in 
Scotland Act 2003 required councils to initiate, facilitate and maintain community planning 
to ensure organisations work together to provide better public services. Indeed, the Act 
established a duty on local authorities and other agencies to implement community planning 
in partnership with citizens and civil society.  
In terms of policy and regulatory instruments, English and Scottish local authorities adopted 
co-governance arrangements. The objectives of the reform and improvement in partnership 
working are 'virtually indistinguishable from those pursued south of the border' (see Downe 
et al 2008:77). Furthermore, co-governance in Scotland became entrenched with Single 
Outcome Agreements (SOAs) from 2008, involving 'joined up' partnership working between 
local authorities and other actors to achieve outcomes based on the Scottish Government's 
five purpose targets and fifteen national outcomes (see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/221748). 
The priority given to the national outcomes framework, based on local authority led 
partnership working can be seen in the internal reviews of the Scottish Government's work 
(Scottish Government, 2010). Following the Crerar Review (2007) it is envisaged that 
performance measures within the Scottish public sector will be streamlined. Thus, it is 
currently suggested that performance measures of local authorities, Best Value Reviews, be 
inclusive of SOAs and thereby a measure of the extent of partnership working in achieving 
national objectives.  
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Research Methodology 
 
The research is based on a case study analysis of two anonymized local authority 
partnerships; one in England and the other in Scotland. Local government in Scotland is a 
devolved function. The research design was therefore to investigate local authority co-
governance in England and Scotland, given that local government is the function of different 
polities, but both have regulatory and policy instruments for partnerships at local government 
level.  
The research involved secondary data of local authority partnership working and primary, 
qualitative data in the form of participant observation and elite interviews with senior 
officials of two local authorities and their partners. The interviews, following a semi-
structured questionnaire, included senior officers of various public organisations and 
members of civil society organisations who were strategically involved in the partnership 
decision making. The focus was extant partnership working involving a network of state and 
non-state actors for both local authorities. Standardised questions were used in a number of 
themed areas: impetus for the partnership; nature of the link between community planning 
and the partnership; relationship between the partnership and the over-arching macro 
instrument and agreement; specific questions on the nature of activities and the extent of co-
operation (e.g. information sharing, joint development of delivery plans, funding and 
budgetary arrangements); reporting lines and accountability of partnership members for 
activities and resource use. There was a shared purpose to the partnerships – both local 
authorities and their partners were involved and committed to regeneration and other aspects 
of service delivery in their respective areas. In addition there is a further comparability of the 
cases – both local authorities are within large urban areas with relatively high indices of 
deprivation and social exclusion. The cases were also selected based on the longevity (more 
than 10 years) of the partnership. Cases were therefore based on established partnerships 
rather than temporary, task or project based entities. We assume the longevity of working 
also allowed for the development of social capital and trust (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; 
2003) – a principle of the governance thesis. A further aspect of the governance thesis was 
that these partnerships were self-organising in the sense that the development of the networks 
preceded statutory and regulatory policy instruments. The partnerships therefore, in 
formulation, had a degree of autonomy from the state, before the regulations were introduced. 
In both cases the local authorities received good performance reviews for partnership 
working and could be considered good practice examples. Table 1 illustrates the primary data 
collection methods and approach. Based on the research, our analysis is framed around 
Rhodes (2000) description of governance, as a testable thesis.  
 
Table 1:  Interviews Undertaken November 2009 – March 2010 
Interviewee / Organisation 
Type 
n = 30 Title 
Partnership Chair 1 Partnership Chair 
Local government 1 Chief Executive 
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Local government 13 Partnership and Regeneration 
manager, Economic 
Development Manager / Team 
Leader (n=2), Policy Manager 
(n=5), Head of Communities 
(n=5) 
Education 1 College Principal 
Voluntary / third sector 1 Chief Executive 
Voluntary / third sector 2 Training Co-ordinator, 
Community Safety Officer 
Police 1 Divisional Commander 
Central government – locally 
employed and based 
8 Job Centre Partnership 
managers (n=5), Head of 
Planning NHS, Chief 
Executive/Director – NHS body 
(n=2) 
Central government 2 Team Leader, core civil service 
directorate, Team Leader, 
Enterprise Directorate Team  
 
Research Findings  
Thesis 1: Governance involves state and non-state actors in a network caused by a need to 
exchange resources and negotiate shared purpose. 
In both cases the networks were self-organising and the partnerships developed out of the 
local authorities‟ political leadership commitment to improve the local area. The policy 
instruments now offer a driver or a steer: as one interviewee in England stated, „community 
planning was there, but now it fits better‟. The partnerships involve state actors from local 
authorities, the NHS, central government, transport services, education, and police; and non-
state actors from civic society organisations. Co-governance between the members of the 
partnerships is at the level of service delivery planning. In both cases this is evident in 
addressing social exclusion policy areas such as youth unemployment and addiction services. 
Much co-governance centred on „cross cutting‟ policy issues where health, community 
safety, transport, economic regeneration, social cohesion and community based services 
intersect. The case study analysis revealed that co-governance was limited to sharing of 
service delivery plans and attempts at alignment. Where co-production did take place this was 
limited to specific areas of joint delivery such as, in England, apprenticeships, community 
safety and reduction of drug use, and, in Scotland, addiction services, some services for the 
elderly and apprenticeships. 
There is limited resource exchange. Strategic joint resourcing for service provision presents a 
much patchier and less aligned pattern. At issue is the fact that different services have 
funding routed through different organisations like local councils, health boards, primary care 
trusts etc, and are accountable to different central government departments and, ultimately, 
their Ministers. Managers and officials in these departments and service organisations are 
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responsible for spending in their respective areas of control. Pooled funds have no separate 
legal existence. Fund hosts must ensure that pooled fund income and spending is properly 
accounted for, that performance is reported on, and that end of year under or over spending is 
properly reported in partners' accounts (CIPFA, 2001). Survey work carried out by the Audit 
Commission in England indicated LSP partners perceived significant obstacles to pooling or 
aligning ranging from 'different organisational cultures' to 'poor understanding of others' 
financial planning and governance arrangements' to 'internal financial pressures' to 'confusing 
of accountability to government departments' (Audit Commission, 2009). Indeed in the 
English case study, an interviewee identified the absence of pooled budgets as an obstacle to 
co-governance. And in the Scottish case study a senior officer stated that budgets were not 
shared since service directors are accountable for their respective budgets.  
Some budgets are aligned according to policy priorities; often areas of funding are ring-
fenced by central government (e.g. addiction, child safety), but it would not be accurate to 
say that mainline budgets are integrated and resources shared. The limitations of co-
governance and resource exchange can be summarised by the following interviewee: 
In this Partnership we work well together, some areas don't work as well as we do here. 
But to do significantly more joint service delivery will not be easy beyond the 'paper 
exercise' level. More joint delivery - some might say real joint delivery - could only come 
with pooled budgets, joint and even unified management and organisation structures. 
There's barriers to this. (Executive Director, Community Health Partnership and 
Partnership Board member) 
Thus, although in both cases co-governance emerged not out of a regulatory or policy 
instrument but rather by a shared purpose, there is limited resource exchange. Even now with 
regulatory frameworks, which have institutionalised co-governance, the continuing 
interaction is a commitment to local area improvement and joint service delivery which may 
be more a function of financial and performance incentives. So although these instances are 
important and significant, the limitations of further co-production should be recognised:  
 Certainly I don’t envisage a situation where all or even most services could be delivered 
by a single public sector management or organisation structure, but there are some areas 
I suppose where we could have completed pooled funding and integrated management – 
older people’s services, mental health, learning disability - much beyond this is difficult in 
my view. (Executive Director, Community Health Partnership) 
 
Thesis 2: Governance networks are characterised by interdependence between organisations. 
A major issue is the nature of relationships among partnership members, including the extent 
to which there is an interdependence with all partners substantively contributing to the work, 
programmes and leading activities (i.e. approaching symmetry in relationships) or, 
alternatively, whether activities, roles and contributions show patterns of differential 
contribution and dependence (i.e. asymmetrical) (Madden, 2010; Agranoff and McGuire, 
2001). The research revealed that, in both cases, local authorities played a dominant role in 
shaping the policy agenda and strategic planning. In fact in the Scottish case there appears to 
be stronger co-governance between the local council and the NHS relative to co-governance 
with other partners. This may be explained by the fact that in Scotland there is statutory 
obligation to include local councillors on NHS Health Boards. In the English case, the 
asymmetry of relationships derived from historical factors. Even in the years when there was 
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established practice of partnership working with both the health authorities and the local 
umbrella group for the voluntary sector, the council itself had a centralist culture. Subsequent 
legislation and elements of „modernisation‟ served to broaden the range of active partners but 
with the local authority playing a central role, partly through the then government‟s provision 
of reward for meeting targets. As the Economic Development Team leader remarked, 
„funding and reward bolsters co-operation‟. 
In the relationship between the partnership-locality and the centre, there was evidence of the 
latter's attempts to steer or influence. This is consistent with other research findings by Kelly 
(2006), Agranoff and McGuire (1998), Bell and Hindmoor (2009) and Ackerman (2003). 
This is articulated for example in various policy documents such as the 2001 White Paper 
from the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions which stated that: 
Councils will make their most effective contribution if, alongside central government, they 
take responsibility for key national priorities and instigate corrective action when 
standards are not met (Cm 5237 para 3.6). 
In Scotland, the introduction of SOAs has seen the alignment of service delivery planning 
and national objectives with the CEO of local authorities signing the agreements and thereby 
being held accountable for the delivery of outcomes as outlined in the agreements. In other 
words, local authorities and by extension their local partners are service deliverers helping 
deliver key national priorities. The Scottish Government official who is the link for this case 
study partnership stated that; 
Who is accountable to Parliament is an issue. We [the Scottish Government]  are 
accountable for the shape of this but this administration has made it clear that it will hold 
the delivery arm to account for services - this has not been fully tested…how would this 
accountability be tested - you cannot really take the money away and it's a political issue. 
In the English case, formal accountabilities reside in the council‟s cabinet, where the 
executive councillors, who act as portfolio lead members have responsibilities connecting 
directly to those within the strategic partnership. Outside the cabinet, the overview and 
scrutiny function introduces another strand of accountability, insofar as non-executive 
councillors in this council take a proactive stance toward their own scrutiny role and have 
initiated specific programmes of activity relating to partnership priorities e.g. around youth 
unemployment. The corporate policy manager remarked, in relation to accountability, that the 
people involved need to be „senior enough‟; while no sanctions are applied to those who do 
not fulfil their roles in the partnership, there are „reputations at stake‟.    
Indeed, a recurring theme in both case studies was that each public sector organisation had to 
account for financial and service delivery performance through various audits and was 
ultimately answerable to political leadership at local and national levels. Thus although there 
are internal accountabilities among co-governance members, the traditional Weberian 
bureaucratic arrangements within state actors‟ organisations exist with accountability to 
political leadership, and an adherence to policy instruments which embed financial and 
performance measures. This supports an asymmetrical relationships rather than an 
interdependence thesis. Furthermore, as Agranoff and McGuire (2003) argue, to assert that in 
terms of inter-organisational relations in governance arrangements, government is relegated 
to the status of just another organisation is inaccurate; rather that government is a critical 
ingredient in intergovernmental networks. Thus, the nature of accountability within public 
bureaucracies; i.e. the importance placed on accountability of public monies, the efficient and 
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effective delivery of public services, shifts the balance of interactions within co-governance 
towards state actors rather than one of inter-dependencies.  
 
Thesis 3: The governance interactions are game-like rooted in trust. 
The literature suggests that trust is important to governance interactions (Rhodes, 2000; 
Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). Accountability and reporting mechanisms within the cases 
appear to be based on trust built up over a lengthy period of time. Many interviewees attested 
to the commitment and leadership within member organisations, and internal accountability. 
A NHS senior officer articulated this view:  
There is a Partnership Agreement which is part of overall accountability. The Partnership 
is responsible for the Single Outcome Agreement and is accountable to the Scottish 
Government. The Single Outcome Agreement has been signed by the partners so there is a 
collective responsibility, but we are individually accountable for certain areas, for 
example health indicators are the responsibility of the NHS…but there is internal 
accountability for this, peer accountability…a pride in the success of the Partnership 
(NHS Head of Planning and Partnership Board Member). 
So there appears to be a perception or expectation that there is internal accountability within 
the partnership but that there is ultimate accountability towards the centre. A similar view 
held by interviewees in the English case study. Each partner brought their own formal 
internal accountabilities to the co-governance arrangement. An Economic Development 
manager discerned „two strands‟ of accountability: first, the clarity that comes with being an 
officer of the council; but, secondly, the „practicalities‟ within the partnership itself which 
can be more „blurred‟, not least because of the large number of organisations involved. Jones 
and Stewart (2009:63) have examined the nature of accountabilities in LSPs and found the 
position to be „confused‟, but see the local authority role in partnership as crucial, especially 
the established relationships of accountability and the community leadership role.    
Thus, there seem to be traditional forms of accountability from various state actors within the 
partnership, juxtaposed with internal accountabilities within co-governance. Partners within 
co-governance appear to be holding each other accountable in a game-like interaction. This 
may be explained by mutual adjustments and interior authority (see Woods, 2003; Ackerman, 
2003). According to Woods (2003) as government structures become less insulated the 
emphasis is shifted to interior authority where particular rationalities of government involve 
the internalisation and responsibilisation of self-discipline or self-surveillance. While this 
may be true certainly in the case studies, there appears to be consciousness by partners in co-
governance of mutual adjustment and self-regulation for the purpose of accountability 
towards the centre. Thus, trust is built upon game-like interactions through internal 
accountability with each partner cognisant of their vertical accountability through a hierarchy 
towards the centre. The „game‟ is therefore more a function of accountability towards and 
steering by the centre than trust per se.  The pattern of internal accountability within the 
partnership between members is tangible, but nonetheless within a clear understanding 
of vertical accountability to the centre/ national levels. The game-like interaction is framed 
through vertical accountabilities which provide limits to the interaction and the extent of 
exchanged resources. Trust is therefore bounded within the artefact of interactions. For 
example, a civil society organisation involved in addressing social exclusion was aware of the 
limits of the local authority budget and „trusted‟ the local authority in delivering upon social 
inclusion plans within the limited available resources with an awareness that the local 
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authority would deliver upon objectives given the accountability to central agencies and the 
political leadership on this policy priority area. Similarly, the local authority „trusted‟ the 
civil society organisation to play its part in achieving objectives aware of the civil society‟s 
own accountabilities and the possibility of the local authority‟s ability to withdraw resources 
if the civil society did not deliver upon objectives. Thus, the interaction is game-like through 
mutually assured „trust‟ based on accountabilities rather than real trust based on social capital 
(see Agranoff and McGuire, 1998). 
Thesis 4: Governance networks have a significant degree of autonomy and are not 
accountable to the state, but self-organising. 
This is perhaps the most contentious aspect of the governance thesis. Scholars of public 
administration will argue that the activities of state actors are subject to accountabilities even 
when in a self-organising network (see Power, 1999). This research suggests that although in 
both cases co-governance took place through self-organisation and preceded policy and 
regulatory instruments, all state actors are accountable through a hierarchy to political 
leadership from local to central government levels. Indeed, even the non-state actors, e.g. 
professionalised voluntary sector organisations, were accountable to various governing 
bodies (see Kelly, 2007; Jackson, 2010; Johnson and Osborne, 2003). Interviewees from 
voluntary sector organisations recognised their subsidiary role and their resource dependency 
with regards to state actors. Voluntary sector organisations have become part of the 
„governable terrain‟ with the formal dimensions of partnership such as accountability for 
performance ensuring that voluntary sector organisations are „drawn into and made subject to 
processes of state governing‟ (Carmel and Harlock, 2008:167).  
Policy documents embed hierarchical accountability as indicated within an Audit 
Commission report. It states that: (a) the council is the legally accountable body, 'Local Area 
Agreements do create legal relationships. When the Secretary of State signs an LAA, it 
becomes a contract with a single tier or county council as accountable bodies' (Audit 
Commission 2009, Main Report para 22); (b) recognised nonetheless that partnerships differ 
from the traditional institutional or organisational linkage between control of resource and 
accountability, 'Local Strategic Partnerships do not control local public service resources; 
they have to influence partners' mainstream spending and activity‟ (Audit Commission 2009, 
Main Report para 11), and that 'partners must be accountable to one another and to the public' 
(Audit Commission 2009, Main Report para 6); but (c) it also takes cognisance of 
traditionally recognised patterns that 'the layered approach to partnership governance and 
management recognises that partners have their own governance arrangements and 
stakeholders' (Audit Commission 2009, Main Report para 117).  
A consistent theme which emerged from the research was that there were asymmetrical 
relationships in co-governance with state actors playing a dominant role. The most dominant 
state actors were in fact local authorities and health organisations given their relatively larger 
budgets and importance in policy areas such as social cohesion. This was further entrenched 
by regulation, but importantly was underpinned by extant traditional bureaucratic structures 
and processes – particularly related to accountability for performance and fiscal prudence 
towards the central bodies and the political leadership in the form of vertical accountability.  
 
Discussion 
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The research sought to explore the governance thesis by answering the calls of scholars for 
more research of governance, networks, partnership and co-governance (Agranoff and 
McGuire, 2001; Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006; Bovaird, 2007; Carmel and Harlock, 2008), 
particularly of a phenomenological/ qualitative nature (see Andrews, Boyne and Enticott, 
2006). Indeed the literature review for this paper provided rich descriptive studies of co-
governance, and other evaluative studies exploring the impact of co-governance on non-state 
actors. Seldom was there a questioning of the extant governance paradigm – the exceptions 
being Stoker (2004); Kelly (2006), Agranoff and McGuire (2001) and Bell and Hindmoor 
(2009). In fact Agranoff and McGuire (2001:1416) argue that there is a need for a more 
explicit understanding of intergovernmental and network management as an important step to 
theoretical approaches to policy making, administration and management. Our research has 
attempted to explore the governance at local government level in four testable theses. We 
found that within two polities, none of the four theses of governance held true. The only 
aspect of governance which appeared to resonate in the case studies was the game-like 
interactions amongst state and non-state actors. 
Why then has the governance thesis become pervasive and gained traction in scholarly works 
and normative prescriptions in policies? The answer is twofold. Firstly, there is observable 
evidence of a „differentiated polity‟ that state actors are engaged in networks with various 
other actors in policy decision making and the delivery of services. However, previous 
research in this area has not delved into the inner workings of co-governance through case 
study analysis nor explored the complex nuances of these networks. Secondly, partnerships 
and co-governance as part of a post new public management paradigm offers a palatable new 
form of government. Giddens (1998) in fact argued that networks provide a more efficient 
and democratically responsive alternative to either markets or hierarchy. Thus, governance 
permeated policy in the UK and elsewhere where good governance became synonymous with 
the integration of networks of state and non-state actors in policy decisions and service 
delivery (see World Bank, 2010).  
Yet research by Stoker (2004) Kelly (2006), Agranoff and McGuire (2001) and Bell and 
Hindmoor (2009) questions, qualifies and in some cases rejects, the governance thesis. For 
example, Bell and Hindmoor (2009:150) „…reject the notion that governments have lost their 
capacity to govern and argue instead that governance is about government seeking to govern 
better rather than seeking to govern less.‟ They argue that while governments are indeed now 
more likely to forge new relationships with a larger range of non-state actors, government 
nevertheless remain the central players in governance relationships. The case study analysis 
for this research certainly supports the latter argument and that of others (Kelly, 2006; Grix 
and Phillpot, 2011) highlighting asymmetries in co-governance with state actors playing a 
central role in networks and partnerships. Indeed, Stoker (2004) argues that the state retains 
the power to coerce and control despite the development of partnerships and co-governance.  
The research for this paper revealed the pervasiveness of public bureaucracies within the 
asymmetries of co-governance. The research supports claims by Agranoff (2006) that 
networks and partnerships alter the boundaries of the state in marginal ways and they do not 
appear to be replacing public bureaucracies in any way. Furthermore, Agranoff (2006:62) 
argues that there are those, for example Rhodes (1997), who believe that collaborative 
structures such as networks are pushing out the traditional role of government to include a 
host of non-governmental decision makers, but Agranoff rejects these claims that networks 
are replacing hierarchies. Agranoff (2006) goes onto argue that in policy decisions, public 
organisations are ultimately responsible with much of service delivery still taking place 
through public agencies. Thus, he argues that government is core with the ability to inject 
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legislative, regulatory and financial considerations into the network – government still 
remains the power broker (ibid). Should we reject the governance thesis? Arguably, it is 
questionable with some research challenging aspects of this thesis. While there are clearly 
observable networks, these networks are limited. Although there is a shared purpose, the 
exchange of resources and interdependences are marginal. In the case studies there were high 
levels of commitment which facilitated internal identity and cohesion. Leadership and 
commitment, including that of elected politicians, was identified as a driver to co-governance 
in the case studies. This finding is consistent with other literature in the field (see Agranoff, 
2001). There was a mutual obligation and internal accountability against a background of 
vertical accountability. It could be argued that this existence of multi-faceted accountabilities 
points to government „steering‟ networks through various policy instruments. It is within this 
area of accountability that the thesis of governance is contestable. The research revealed the 
pervasiveness of public bureaucracy and vertical accountability. Bell and Hindmoor (2009) 
argue that hierarchy has been supplemented, although not replaced, by governance through 
markets and associations with interest groups and community engagement. Furthermore, the 
involvement of a wider range of actors in the process of governing has not been at the 
expense of the pivotal role played by governments (ibid). They argue that governments have 
chosen new modes of governing whilst retaining its pre-eminent position (ibid). Thus 
governments have extended hierarchical control and enhanced its capacity to achieve its 
policy goals (ibid).  
The research suggested that in case studies in two different UK localities and polities, state 
actors retained a pre-eminent position and had expanded their influence through networks, 
facilitated by policy instruments to enhance their capacity to achieve policy goals of the 
centre. Moreover, the collaborative arrangements were strongest in service planning among 
state actors (e.g. local council and NHS; council and central government agency). In addition, 
non-state actors involved in co-governance tended to be professionalised organisations (see 
Johnson and Osborne, 2003; Kelly, 2007; Carmel and Harlock, 2008) often with comparable 
structures to those of state actors. Arguably, public bureaucracies have not been replaced or 
marginalised but have assumed a new mode of state authority.  
We suggest this new mode is focused at the level of institutional structures, termed meta-
bureaucracy where state and non-state actors through bureaucratic structures achieve policy 
goals, but that the state through policy asymmetries maintains a powerful role. The case study 
analysis supports Anderson‟s (2004:7) argument that: 
Many researchers have claimed that the restructuring of governance is a general retreat 
of government and the state…yet there is no reason to assume that the rise of governance 
necessarily leads to a decline of government…the main reason for the rise in state 
capacity…is…the fact that the state is now able to influence hitherto non-governmental 
spheres of social life through partnerships i.e. the enlargement of state competencies. 
Meta-bureaucracy involves the prevalence of hierarchies of state and non-state organisations 
perhaps „hidden‟ within partnerships and structures of governance where decision making is 
not necessarily negotiated among „partners‟, but rather it is state actors which dominate the 
interaction where there are asymmetries of decision making towards the advantage of the 
state in achieving policy goals and fulfilling accountabilities.  
 
Conclusion 
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Governance remains highly contested in the research literature. Part of this contestation is 
about nuances surrounding the concept. There is a downplaying of the traditional governing 
role of government -which the term governance has come to imply- and a playing up of the 
role of self regulating networks; another view claims that governance in fact extends the 
capacities of governments and extends the realms into which government can mobilise in its 
attempt to govern better; the analysis that meta-governance is used by government to 
maintain control over a distance often in the „shadow of hierarchy‟ – with a variant of the 
meta-regulation school being that „the state is no longer sovereign authority...it becomes just 
one participant among a pluralistic guidance system‟ (Jessop, 2004:71). 
The case research has shown governments‟ roles in public policy and service delivery have 
not declined, but have extended through various modes of governance, i.e. networks, 
partnerships, co-governance and co-production. Policy instruments in England (LSPs and 
former LAAs) and Scotland (SOAs) have facilitated network interactions, co-governance and 
co-production, and thereby the authority of the state. The result is not necessarily a growth of 
autonomous networks and governance arrangements, but rather the extension of bureaucracy 
and bureaucratic controls – meta-bureaucracy. This is a function of policy instruments, 
regulation, financial arrangements, accountability (particularly vertical accountability), the 
integration of professionalised civil society organisations and resource dependencies.  
Meta-bureaucracy conceptually complements the literature on governance and partnerships. 
Governance literature is very strong on the process aspects of governing, government and 
governance – e.g. role of the state in its relationships with sub state institutions, multi-level 
governance systems, international relations environments, relationships between states and 
supra-state and para-statal bodies (e.g. see Borzel and Risse 2010). Research and literature on 
partnerships has focused on resource dependencies and exchanges between constituent 
members, typologies of partnership, means of co-ordination in partnerships, relationship 
between representative democracy and partnerships, conditions required for effective and 
sustainable partnership working (e.g. Skelcher and Sullivan 2008, Klijn and Skelcher 2007 
Patton 2002, Agranoff and McGuire 1999, Huxham 1996, Benson 1975). We argue that 
meta- bureaucracy: 
 Is a valuable concept to analyse bureaucratic structures, institutions and organisations 
of  governance networks or partnerships;  
 Involves organisational interactions within networks to attain policy goals and ensures 
vertical accountabilities for performance and resource use; and 
 Indicates public bureaucratic structures are not being replaced, but remain pre-
eminent in the achievement of policy goals.  
There is likely to be an active research agenda on meta-bureaucracy given contemporary 
policy agendas. The „Big Society‟ and localisation ambitions of the UK coalition government 
aim to see more public service delivery undertaken at sub state level by non state actors, 
including third sector and local communities, often in partnership with state bodies. How 
bureaucratic capacity and capability of both state and non state bodies can address such a 
policy environment is a moot point; research and evidence gathering will be vital. There are a 
range of other researchable areas of pertinence to meta-bureaucracy especially in an era of 
financial austerity. For instance, what will be the extent of bureaucratic consolidation? Within 
partnerships, will individual state bureaucracies pursue strategies to preserve their own 
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position against other state as well as non-state actors? Will contractualisation, 
commissioning and localising of government funded services give greater independence and 
capability to contractors and non state bodies or, rather, consolidate power and resource to 
central state structures? Will game-like behaviour increase with associated transaction costs? 
These and other research questions should provide a lively research field to increase our 
understanding of meta-bureaucracy. 
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